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INTERNATIONAL ACTORS  
AND THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF  
ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORM 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN* 
Policies to control corruption will always be controversial and 
contested.  Those subject to increased surveillance or limits on their 
discretion will bewail the lack of trust these constraints imply.  
They will complain that the new controls are politically motivated 
and that they fail to respect cultural norms.  These objections will 
be particularly evident when anti-corruption measures are 
imposed or supported by international actors—most notably aid 
and lending bodies, global non-profits, or international treaty 
regimes.  The role of international institutions is necessarily 
limited, given the dominant position of nation-states.  
Nevertheless, well-executed efforts can benefit ordinary people 
and may help, rather than harm, domestic and global businesses.  
The losers are those who benefited from corrupt transactions both 
in government and in the private sector. 
International institutions began to promote an anti-corruption 
agenda in the mid-nineties.  The end of the Cold War facilitated 
these initiatives.  For a time, these institutions and their powerful 
backers in wealthy countries faced no significant opposition.  
Corrupt government leaders in developing countries could no 
longer play off the Communist and anti-Communist blocs against 
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one another.  The bargaining power of domestic anti-corruption 
advocates increased. 
But recently, the rise of global investment from China and 
other middle-income countries, which were not part of the initial 
anti-corruption consensus, has given some political leaders 
leverage to resist reform, especially if the host state is resource rich.  
I do not mean to suggest that the leaders of emerging middle-
income countries actively encourage their investors’ corruption or 
benefit from it personally.  In fact, they may also be trying to limit 
its impact.  Nevertheless, the growing importance of 
multinationals from countries outside the 1990s “anti-corruption 
consensus” poses a challenge.  On the positive side, these firms 
increase competition in global markets, but on the negative side, 
their use of corrupt tactics increases the pressure on all firms to 
follow suit. 
My inquiry begins with the fundamental political/economic 
problems facing modern states, and it then asks how corruption 
can exacerbate these problems.  With that background, I consider 
feasible options for international bodies operating under severe 
political and financial constraints.  Here are the key questions: 
What is the particular problem of most concern?  Is it 
stagnating or uneven economic growth in low-income countries or 
regions?  Is it persistently high levels of poverty and low levels of 
human development?  Is it the lack of a competitive international 
environment for international trade and investment?  Is it 
disillusionment with the state—its electoral institutions, the 
bureaucracy, or the judiciary—fueled by the belief that 
government officials are unconcerned with ordinary citizens’ rights 
and interests? 
What special problems arise in new democracies with fragile 
and untested institutions or in ones where the military is the only 
well-organized institution?  Are post-conflict environments 
especially vulnerable, or do they provide opportunities for 
breaking with a dysfunctional past? 
How does corruption in its various forms affect each of these 
issues?  A satisfactory approach must disaggregate the concept of 
“corruption” and measure the impact of each component on the 
particular problem of interest.  Thus, one could focus either on 
bribery and extortion in the day-to-day interactions between 
citizens, domestic firms, and state officials or on high-level 
malfeasance involving top officials (e.g., politicians, top 
bureaucrats, military brass) and large firms—often multi-nationals 
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seeking contracts or concessions.  Should reformers extend their 
reach beyond outright bribery and extortion to consider the 
different legal routes through which private wealth, both domestic 
and foreign, influences public actors? 
Given the conceptual and empirical connections between 
corruption and policy outcomes, what anti-corruption policies 
might succeed in advancing these goals?  Limiting corruption is a 
means to an end.  The ends of most interest to reformers should 
determine which policies deserve emphasis.  As John Dugard 
argues, freedom from corruption ought not to be classified as a 
human right on its own.  Rather, its control can help further a 
variety of human rights if targeted at areas where corruption 
undermines rights.1  In choosing between means, one should trace 
the link between policy initiatives and outcomes—often a difficult 
job, because information on the costs and benefits of alternatives is 
often hard to obtain. 
Finally, what do international actors contribute?  International 
actors are constrained by their own distinctive institutional and 
resource limitations.  For example, there is some evidence that 
presidential democracies are more corruption-prone than 
parliamentary systems.2  However, no international institution is 
prepared to encourage regime change of that sort—except perhaps 
in a post-revolutionary or post-conflict situation, where the 
country itself is rethinking its constitutional arrangements.3  Even 
                                                     
1 See John Dugard, Corruption: Is There a Need for a New Convention?, in ANTI-
CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? 159 
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul Carrington eds., forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter, 
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY] (discussing how corruption can undermine human 
rights but arguing that corruption should not be treated as a per se human rights 
violation). 
2 See generally Jana Kunicová & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Electoral Rules and 
Constitutional Structure as Constraints on Corruption, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 573 (2005) 
(providing statistical evidence that presidential democracies are likely to be more 
corrupt than parliamentary systems).  See also, Tina Søreide, Democracy’s 
Shortcomings in Anti-Corruption, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 129, supra note 1 
(contending that a democratic system with checks and balances may not suffice to 
combat corruption). 
3 Of course, constitutions are amended and replaced with some frequency, 
for example, in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union and 
democratization of Eastern Europe and in the current Middle East.  The changes, 
however, may enhance, not limit, rent-seeking possibilities.  Thus, in Africa over 
the last three decades, eighteen of twenty-one countries that began the post-
colonial period as parliamentary democracies shifted to presidential systems.  See 
James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, Endogenous Presidentialism 34 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14603, 2008).  A majority of those that 
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if outsiders take the fundamental constitutional structure as given, 
they can point out particular risks and recommend ways to limit 
corruption within constitutional constraints.4 
In short, international institutions face a linked set of issues: 
from defining the underlying problem, to defining corruption and 
understanding how it can exacerbate (or defuse) the problem, to 
seeking policy levers that might limit the impact of corruption, 
and, finally, to identifying appropriate routes for international 
influence.  These complexities and tensions are disguised if anti-
corruption goals are formulated at too high a level of generality.  
But once international actors move to concrete initiatives, 
limitations of knowledge and capacity will become apparent, and 
conflicts between different types of anti-corruption efforts will 
surface. 
Section 1 presents a taxonomy of international actors involved 
in anti-corruption activity.  Section 2 connects corruption policy to 
its ultimate objectives: global market efficiency, economic growth, 
poverty alleviation, and government legitimacy.  Section 3 links 
international anti-corruption initiatives with these underlying 
goals.  Finally, section 4 broadens the focus by moving beyond 
illegal corruption to consider the legal routes through which 
private wealth can influence public power. 
1. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: A TAXONOMY 
Four types of international actors play important roles, but they 
do not always agree on anti-corruption priorities and strategies.  
First, and most obvious, are the aid and lending organizations—
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank, 
and bilateral donors.  They sponsor governance and anti-
corruption projects in member countries and also seek to avoid 
corruption in their own lending and grant programs.  They 
                                                                                                                        
switched are resource rich, suggesting choices consistent with results cited by 
Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 579, 587–600 (linking corruption to 
the diversion of public resources for self-interested uses and subsequently 
connecting corruption with presidentialism).  Robinson and Torvik develop a 
model where the constitutional structure is endogenous to the level of rents 
available to political elites. 
4 For a study that takes this point of view, see, e.g., Joseph Ayee et al., 
Political Economy of the Mining Sector in Ghana 1 (World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 5730, 2011) (arguing for “appropriate reforms” in Ghana’s 
governance and “greater awareness of incentive problems at the political level 
and their possible implications for sector performance and the economy at large”).  
The study is, of course, a working paper, not a statement of World Bank policy. 
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support reforms that aim to limit corrupt incentives and to 
improve domestic oversight of the public sector.  Programs seek to 
reform government service delivery and establish accountability 
institutions.5  Sometimes programs directly target domestic anti-
corruption laws and law enforcement systems.  The IFIs also seek 
to enforce their own “law” that forbids payoffs and kickbacks.6 
They are concerned with the goals of economic growth and 
poverty alleviation, but also with the integrity and legitimacy of 
their own governance structures. 
The second set is directly concerned with civil and criminal law 
enforcement across borders.  There are two institutional 
frameworks.  One focuses on catching and punishing miscreants 
using the civil and the criminal law.  The offenders are firms 
engaged in international business, the firms’ managers, organized 
crime groups, and country leaders who enrich themselves through 
kickbacks and extortion.  These institutions provide information on 
national legal regimes covering money laundering, asset recovery, 
and extradition, and they may help train prosecutors and police for 
domestic anti-corruption work.  They generally do not have an 
explicit development or poverty alleviation agenda. 
The other international legal regime resolves commercial 
disputes.  Corruption may have facilitated a disputed contract up 
front, but the international arbitration system has only recently 
                                                     
5 Two chapters in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY highlight aspects of this work at 
the World Bank.  See, Jana Kunicová, The Role of the World Bank in Promoting Good 
Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms: A View from the Europe and Central Asia 
Region, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 41, supra note 1 (exploring the World Bank’s 
efforts to fortify public financial management and service delivery, among other 
aspects of governance); Francesca Recanatini, Tackling Corruption and Promoting 
Better Governance: The Road Ahead, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 55, supra note 1 
(discussing World Bank efforts to promote ownership and sustainability of anti-
corruption reforms by governments).  See also Francesca Recanatini, Assessing 
Corruption at the Country Level, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN 
CORRUPTION 34 (Adam Graycar & Russell G. Smith eds., 2011) (describing a 
diagnostic tool that uses empirical data to establish corruption reform goals 
specific to individual countries). 
6 See, e.g., Int’l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. [IBRD] & Int’l Dev. Ass’n 
[IDA], World Bank Sanctions Procedures, WORLD BANK (Jan. 1, 2011) (setting forth a 
sanctions regime for misuse of World Bank funds through fraud or corruption).  
See also, Pascale Hélène Dubois & Aileen Elizabeth Nowlan, Global Administrative 
Law and the Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes in International Law, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 
ONLINE 15 (2010), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-dubois-nowlan-global-
administrative-law-sanctions.pdf (explaining the World Bank’s sanctions 
procedures).  More information is available at the website of the World Bank’s 
investigative unit.  See Integrity Vice Presidency, WORLD BANK, http://www.World 
bank.org/integrity (last visited May 5, 2013). 
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recognized a responsibility to deal with such allegations and to 
provide damages ex post.  Even when it does confront the issue, the 
existing arbitration system is not well equipped to investigate and 
punish corruption, which often falls under the criminal law.  
Arbitrators, however, are beginning to seek ways to respond 
constructively.  Going beyond the commercial arbitration regime, 
private litigants are seeking other forms of redress before 
international tribunals and ordinary domestic courts, sometimes 
invoking private rights of action under existing statutes.   
One justification for strengthened international law 
enforcement is to level the playing field for multinational firms so 
that honest firms do not operate at a disadvantage.  If leveling 
down is unacceptable, honest global actors may seek to level up.  
The goal is a more competitive and transparent global marketplace 
for trade and investment.  The international legal regime does not 
deal with the root causes of poverty but, rather, seeks to deter 
high-level corruption by making it costly and risky.  Economic 
development and poverty alleviation may also be furthered if it 
becomes more difficult for corrupt leaders to operate with 
impunity and to transfer their gains abroad with ease.  The result 
may be better and more fairly distributed economic outcomes. 
The third set of institutional actors is a diverse group of 
international nonprofit institutions with an anti-corruption and 
good government agenda, including organizations that support 
investigative journalism and freedom of the press.  Here I would 
also include individual investigative journalists and writers, some 
associated with major for-profit media outlets and others operating 
on a free-lance basis.  These diverse institutions have no official 
role within states or internationally; they obtain their legitimacy 
from their own integrity and the convincing nature of their 
arguments and information they disclose.  They operate through 
franchises in the form of local chapters, such as Transparency 
International; seek the cooperation of businesses and governments 
through a standard-setting and monitoring process, such as the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”); gather and 
organize country-level data, such as Global Integrity; and expose 
corruption and other forms of wrongdoing, such as Global 
Witness.7  Most groups straddle several of these categories.  Global 
                                                     
7 Transparency International is an anti-corruption organization with more 
than one hundred national chapters worldwide.  See Our Organisation: Overview, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation 
(last visited May 5, 2013).  The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
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Witness, for example, has no national chapters, but uses exposés as 
a way to push for policy changes and to promote institutional 
reforms such as the EITI.8   
These unofficial groups operate variously as pressure groups 
that seek to put corruption on the reform agenda of other 
institutions, and as information-providers that put domestic 
reform efforts in an international context and publicize both 
positive and negative developments.  They may support research 
on the causes and consequences of corruption and on the effect of 
reforms, but faced with budgetary limits and the need to 
demonstrate progress to funders, they sometimes must trade off 
long-term research projects against short-term efforts to influence 
current debate.9  They differ in their degree of confrontation with 
sitting governments.  Some groups have tried to build broad 
coalitions to counteract the power of corrupt elites without openly 
challenging them or by trying to co-opt them into anti-corruption 
initiatives.  Others focus on exposing corruption and using 
scandals as a mechanism to raise public awareness so that people 
will push for change.  Each has risks.  The former strategy risks 
giving cover to ongoing corrupt arrangements; the latter risks 
increasing public cynicism by revealing the pervasive character of 
official malfeasance. 
Fourth and finally, international business firms work through 
some of the nonprofit groups listed above.  Transparency 
International-USA, for example, operates with extensive business 
                                                                                                                        
“is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and 
international organizations.”  What is the EITI?, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti (last 
visited May 5, 2013).  Global Integrity annually investigates the “transparency of 
the public procurement process, media freedom, asset disclosure requirements, 
[and] conflicts of interest regulations” in dozens of countries.  See GLOBAL 
INTEGRITY REPORT, http://www.globalintegrity.org/report (last visited May 5, 
2013).  Global Witness is an organization that investigates and exposes natural 
resource-related conflict and corruption.  See Our Work, GLOBAL WITNESS, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/ (last visited May 5, 2013) 
8 Thus, Global Witness’s Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign led to the 
establishment of the PWYP coalition, which, in turn, led to the creation of the 
EITI.  See History, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/ 
about/history (last visited May 5, 2013); History of EITI, EITI, 
http://eiti.org/eiti/history (last visited May 5, 2013). 
9 Global Witness (“GW”) has avoided these tradeoffs by planning long-term 
campaigns and raising money to finance them up front, and then reporting on 
their progress.  GW integrates long-term campaigns (the oldest is sixteen years) 
with case studies that further inform its demands for policy change.  Short-term 
gains are steps on the way to long-term objectives.  See E-mail from Patrick Alley, 
Co-founder, Global Witness, to author (Aug. 12, 2011) (on file with author).   
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support and board membership because U.S. multi-nationals, 
subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, have an interest 
in controlling corruption in business worldwide.  Other firms work 
with business associations, such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce or their own trade associations, to promote codes of 
good conduct and promote anti-corruption policies.  Voluntary 
initiatives, such as the EITI, provide public relations benefits for 
firms that comply with their standards.  Top management and 
board members of a few global firms have spoken out individually 
in support of strong anti-corruption policies.  Business interests 
both interact with, and are in some tension with, the other actors 
listed above.  Sometimes preventing corruption in global business 
improves a firm’s profits; at other times it limits their trade and 
investment opportunities. 
2. GOALS AND STRATEGIES 
How can anti-corruption initiatives further the fundamental 
goals of efficient international markets, poverty alleviation, 
economic growth, and government legitimacy?  I outline general 
approaches here that may or may not involve international 
institutions.  My discussion is necessarily brief, but it draws on a 
body of research that has deepened and developed exponentially 
in recent years.  This summary sets the stage for consideration of 
specific international responses in Section 3. 
2.1. Efficient International Markets 
Anti-corruption efforts can promote efficiency in international 
markets.  High-level international corruption may suppress 
competition in global markets by discouraging some investors 
from taking advantage of otherwise profitable opportunities.  
Corrupt rulers may commit their countries to foolish, uneconomic 
public projects that place a burden on taxpayers into the future and 
that starve needed services, such as education and health.  With 
widespread corruption, even nominally beneficial infrastructure 
projects, such as roads, bridges, port facilities, or power plants, 
may be too large, poorly located, and shabbily constructed. 
Because of underlying monopoly power, some corrupt deals 
may just redistribute profits between multi-national corporations 
(“MNCs”) and corrupt officials with no impact on market 
efficiency.  In such cases, the fundamental inefficiency arises from 
monopoly power, not bribery.  However, this inefficiency seems to 
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be a special case; in general, corrupt public officials and their 
business firm counterparts can exclude competitors and can 
influence the content of contracts, not just the price.  They have 
incentives to distort public choices in order to increase the rents 
available to share and in order to design projects where bribes are 
easy to hide—for example, one-of-a-kind capital-intensive projects 
that are poorly adapted to local conditions. 
Efficient international markets can promote growth in low- and 
middle-income countries if they lower transaction costs and reduce 
the risks of trade and investment.  However, the evidence suggests 
that free trade and open investment are not sufficient to secure 
growth if poor governance is pervasive.  A corrupt but stable 
country could be quite attractive to investors even if few of the 
benefits of its activity flow to local businesses and ordinary 
citizens.  Consider, for example, the cases of Greece and Italy, 
which were able to borrow billions on international markets in 
spite of high levels of corruption and otherwise dysfunctional 
governments.10  When corrupt or self-serving leaders set priorities, 
there are both efficiency and distributive consequences.  Those 
individuals in power favor projects that benefit them, neglecting 
investments with larger social gains that would be more broadly 
distributed.  Thus, those whose primary focus is on economic 
growth, poverty alleviation, or good government will not be 
content with an international anti-corruption strategy that 
concentrates on international business deals.  International actors 
should not just focus on a country’s levels of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as a measure of success.  They need to examine 
the impact of FDI on ordinary people and the local business 
climate; they need to ask if corruption at the top has limited the 
flow of benefits to the citizenry. 
2.2. Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation 
Broadly speaking, if economic growth and poverty alleviation 
are the main goals, then anti-corruption efforts enter the picture to 
assure that poor citizens, as well as domestic small- and medium-
sized business, benefit from development.  Anti-corruption efforts 
are necessary, but not sufficient: local officials must also deliver 
public services competently.  An abrupt drop in corruption 
                                                     
10 For a popular account of the Greek case, see Michael Lewis, Beware of 
Greeks Bearing Bonds, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.vanityfair.com/ 
business/features/2010/10/greeks-bearing-bonds-201010.print. 
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without affirmative efforts to assure competence can have 
disastrous consequences.  Because corruption is a symptom of a 
poorly functioning government, reform programs should never 
simply target law enforcement.  They should be part of a broader 
effort to change the way state officials interact with society.11 
A first round of reforms should examine corrupt programs to 
see whether some might simply be eliminated along with their 
corrupt incentives.  This initial step could lead either to the repeal 
of certain rules and regulations or to the privatization of whole 
sectors under public ownership.  This strategy implies both that 
such programs, even if honestly administered, do not serve 
important public purposes and that repeal lowers overall 
corruption, rather than just shifting it someplace else.12  But 
privatization brings its own problems.  If public firms are 
privatized with their monopoly power intact, commercial bribery 
may replace public corruption as suppliers jockey for advantage 
and private monopoly profits substitute for payoffs.  Even if a 
public monopoly is broken up in the privatization process, the 
resulting entities may operate corruptly by obtaining contracts 
through bribery and debasing product quality.13  Thus, the risk of 
shrinking the state as an anti-corruption strategy provides a stark 
reminder that anti-corruption policies need to be embedded in a 
broader context of overall government functioning.  A narrow 
focus on limiting corruption can backfire.14 
                                                     
11 The arguments summarized here are developed in SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 9–68 (1999).  
For an overview of empirical studies of corruption and reform efforts in particular 
contexts, see Susan Rose-Ackerman & Rory Truex, Corruption and Policy Reform, in 
GLOBAL PROBLEMS, SMART SOLUTIONS: COSTS AND BENEFITS (Bjørn Lomborg ed., 
forthcoming 2013). 
12 See Liam Wren-Lewis, Anti-Corruption Policy in Regulation and Procurement: 
The Role of International Actors, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 91, 97–98, supra note 1. 
13 See generally LAURENCE COCKCROFT, GLOBAL CORRUPTION: MONEY, POWER 
AND ETHICS IN THE MODERN WORLD (2012) (illustrating this concept with examples 
of cotton ginners in Tanzania who adulterated their cotton and pharmaceutical 
companies in China that bribed hospitals). 
14 For recent research that emphasizes this general point, see Emmanuelle 
Auriol & Stéphane Staub, Privatization of Rent-Generating Industries and Corruption, 
in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, VOLUME II 207 
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide eds., 2011); Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-
Lewis, Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, VOLUME II 269 (Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Tina Søreide eds., 2011); Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Corruption 
and Collusion: Strategic Complements in Procurement, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 
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Second, a country can reduce corruption by repealing laws 
protecting the environment or preserving public health or by 
eliminating taxes—but at an unacceptable loss in public welfare.  
In such cases, structural reforms can reduce corrupt incentives and 
provide public benefits.  Countries can simplify these regulations 
and tax laws so that officials have less discretion, and so that 
outsiders can easily observe violations.  If some rules are so 
stringent that organizations and individuals routinely violate them 
in return for payoffs, the law should be redesigned to make 
compliance plausible.  For example, in some post-communist 
states, tax collection descended into a vicious spiral where high tax 
rates led to widespread violations, fueled by payoffs.  The resulting 
inadequate level of revenues led to further increases in tax rates, 
encouraging even more taxpayers to pay off tax collectors.  It 
would have been better to lower tax rates and increase support for 
a credible anti-corruption effort. 
Third, scarcity spurs payoffs.  If a public benefit is not available 
to all who can qualify and if it is allocated at the discretion of 
officials, bribes can allocate the benefit to the unscrupulous 
applicants who are willing to pay the most.  Legalizing the 
payments can limit corruption—for example, by auctioning off the 
benefit to the high bidders.  This change would expand the pool of 
beneficiaries to include all who are willing to pay, not just those 
willing to break the law.  The problem, of course, is that many 
public programs are not meant to benefit those willing to pay the 
most for them.  Benefits for businesses, such as quotas for the 
import of capital goods or licenses to harvest timber consistent 
with environmental values, might be auctioned off with a gain to 
the Treasury and no loss of social value.  Auctioning off places in 
public housing, eligibility for university places, or access to a 
limited public health benefit, however, will undermine the 
redistributive or merit-based goals of such programs.  In those 
cases, countries must deal with corruption through techniques that 
mix monitoring with program redesign to limit official discretion.  
The state can monitor internally or encourage whistleblowers who 
earn rewards for their activities.  Furthermore, even when auctions 
appear efficient or socially acceptable—for example, in the 
allocation of limited timber concessions or capital imports—the 
state should assure that the winners do not engage in corruption ex 
                                                                                                                        
ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, VOLUME II 108 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina 
Søreide eds., 2011). 
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post to increase their profits.  For example, they might mislabel 
capital imports or tropical timber exports and then pay off customs 
agents to overlook their behavior. 
Fourth, a fully compromised bureaucracy may need to be 
replaced wholesale.  For example, the Georgian government fired 
all its traffic police and then rehired one-third of them, seeking to 
disrupt established patterns of corruption by giving the police new 
cars and uniforms and hoping to instill a new pride in honest 
service.15  This change in attitudes required both personnel changes 
and changes in the mode of operation.  Gradual change is not 
feasible if the system is in a low-level trap where corrupt 
expectations build on themselves. 
2.3. Government Legitimacy 
Governments appear more legitimate to their citizens if they 
are more open and transparent and have established ways for 
citizens to hold officials accountable.  Of course, political leaders 
might manipulate information and access to persuade the public to 
support a secretive regime, but such a state hardly counts as a 
legitimate expression of popular will.  In addition to the key role of 
elections, other institutions help citizens monitor the state, and 
they deserve support even in non-democratic regimes.  These 
institutions include freedom of information acts, ombudsmen, and 
independent oversight bodies such as audit agencies, electoral 
commissions, anti-corruption commissions, and constitutional 
courts.  Laws governing conflicts of interests and ethical standards 
for civil servants, politicians, and business people can also help.  
The protection of whistleblowers can complement these efforts by 
encouraging those inside government to come forward without 
fear of losing their jobs and by rewarding those in the private 
sector who report malfeasance.  Whistleblowers are often looked 
on with distaste, especially in societies where loyalty to kin and 
close associates is a primary value.  However, such protections are 
necessary to break up the tight links that permit corruption and 
self-dealing to become entrenched.  Even so, they are of little 
practical use unless the law enforcement system operates well.  If 
                                                     
15 WORLD BANK, FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC SERVICES: CHRONICLING 
GEORGIA’S REFORMS 15–18 (2012), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ 
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/01/20/000356161_201201
2001093/Rendered/PDF/664490PUB0EPI0065774B09780821394755.pdf 
(summarizing the reforms to the traffic police). 
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the system does not, corrupt allegations can serve as a simple, 
convenient way to take revenge on a rival. 
Some countries have adequate laws on the books, and these 
countries may even enforce these laws relatively well against low-
level offenders.  The government then argues that it is successfully 
tackling corruption.  In practice, however, one law exists for civil 
servants and another for top officials.  Above a certain level, the 
political elite may operate with impunity.  Sectoral reform does not 
touch such self-dealing.  The phenomenon is particularly common 
in resource-rich states where concessions for oil and other minerals 
are handled at the highest levels and often involve generous 
signing bonuses that may or may not be kept secret.  Sometimes 
the payoffs are so much a part of ordinary practice that they are 
not illegal even though they obviously only benefit the leadership.  
Their transparency hardly matters because there are no effective 
mechanisms for the citizenry to hold leaders to account.16 
2.4. Post-Conflict Countries 
Post-conflict countries are a special case where both political 
and economic rebuilding must occur and where weak institutions 
combine with financial inflows to create corrupt opportunities.  
The large influx of foreign funds in a short time frame makes 
control difficult but also extremely important.  Evidence from 
many post-conflict countries such as Guatemala, Burundi, and 
Angola, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that corruption 
is often a serious problem that may undermine the credibility of 
both the post-conflict government and international donors.  If a 
foreign military presence follows conflict, corrupt deals may 
involve its contractors, both domestic and international, 
undermining the legitimacy of the rebuilding effort.17  
                                                     
16 See, e.g., Ayee et al., supra note 4, at 20–21 (reporting on the lack of vertical 
and horizontal controls of political corruption in Ghana, generally and in specific 
industries); Tina Søreide et al., Chr. Michelson Inst. & Centro de Estudos e 
Investigação Científica, Public Construction Projects—Angola: A Need to Fortify the 
Barriers Against Corruption, 1 ANGOLA BRIEF 1 (2011), available at http://www. 
cmi.no/publications/file/4019-public-construction-projects-angola.pdf (outlining 
a similar struggle in Angola). 
17 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National 
Conflict, in CORRUPTION, GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER 66 (Robert I. Rotberg 
ed., 2009); Raymond June & Nathaniel Heller, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in 
Peacebuilding: Toward a Unified Framework, 14 NEW ROUTES 10, 11 (2009) (stating 
that peace building efforts are at risk of corruption, especially given that these 
efforts rarely include a strong anti-corruption component); STUART W. BOWEN, JR., 
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2.5. Structural Reform, Culture, and Law Enforcement 
States will have difficulty implementing anti-corruption 
reforms successfully if officials and ordinary citizens accept 
bribery, cronyism, and favoritism as facts that keep the system 
running, and if they view some forms of special treatment as 
desirable because, for example, they further kinship or ethnic ties.  
However, anthropological work shows that people may 
simultaneously accept and condemn corruption.  They condemn 
the malfeasance of their political leaders but spend their lives in a 
world full of favoritism and rule-breaking.18  This paradox 
suggests that if reformers do come to power, they need to work 
hard to inform citizens of the overall social costs of corruption.  At 
the same time, they need to implement a credible criminal and civil 
law enforcement regime that ends the impunity of public and 
private actors.19  Once corruption has become a risky activity, 
reformers can then get public support to redesign programs so that 
honest people can operate without looking like dupes or suckers.  
The structural approach developed in this essay suggests that pure 
efforts at moral reform and law enforcement are unlikely to be 
effective unless underlying changes in government functioning 
make it is relatively easy and cheap to be honest. 
3. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
A range of nonprofit international institutions, including IFIs, 
civil society groups, treaties, and dispute resolution systems, 
confront corruption either as a primary goal or as a complement to 
their main activity.  These institutions act in many different ways.  
                                                                                                                        
HARD LESSONS: THE IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.sigir.mil/publications/hardLessons.html (explaining that, as the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Bowen faced 
“[i]nstitutionalized corruption infect[ing] both the government [of Iraq] and the 
supporting UN programs”). 
18 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State, 120 
YALE L. J. ONLINE 125, 130 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/11/10/rose-
ackerman.html (“Ordinary people condemn corruption at the elite level, but they 
themselves participate in networks that socially reproduce corruption.”). 
19 Effective law enforcement, of course, does not mean zero corruption 
because, as Johann Graf Lambsdorff points out, such enforcement could result in 
costs that are relatively high compared to the benefits.  He recommends various 
ways to destabilize the corrupt relationship so that participants become unsure 
that the other person will reciprocate.  Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Securing Investor 
Confidence or Fighting Corruption? How Intergovernmental Organizations May 
Reconcile Two Opposing Goals, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 215, supra note 1. 
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They carry out concrete reform programs in an effort to strengthen 
government capacity.  They train domestic officials, journalists, 
and civil society to identify and publicize corruption, and they 
monitor international financial flows and business deals for 
evidence of corruption.  Other institutions provide a framework for 
resolving cross-border commercial disputes, seek to persuade other 
international actors—notably, business and financial firms—to 
adopt a broader view of their social obligations, and produce and 
disseminate information on corruption, government quality, and 
successful reforms. 
For-profit international actors—including global business 
firms, financial institutions, as well as organized crime—may be 
embedded in corrupt networks that they either struggle against or 
actively promote.  Business and financial firms may try to remain 
within the law by creative organizational and legal strategies.  
Terrorist groups and guerilla armies may finance their activities 
through the undercover sales of natural resources, using 
corruption to smooth their operations.  International actors may 
sometimes contribute to the corrupt environment; if so, they have a 
special obligation to counteract these tendencies, perhaps in 
cooperation with nonprofit institutions that focus on limiting 
corruption. 
The options for international actors fall into three broad 
categories: information provision, international frameworks, and 
domestic reform projects.20  They range from those likely to 
generate little pushback from domestic actors, to those that depend 
on the voluntary participation of nation states, to efforts to reform 
a state’s internal methods of operation.  Not all of these policies are 
explicitly aimed at limiting corruption; the underlying goals 
sketched previously may be the explicit justification for programs 
whose proximate effect is to reduce corruption. 
Table 1 presents the three policy goals as columns and the three 
broad types of international action as rows.21  This produces nine 
options but, in practice, there are only six important categories.  
The blank spaces are not absolutely empty.  Rather, policies 
discussed under one category may have an indirect effect on 
                                                     
20 See also the somewhat different framework in Wren-Lewis, supra note 12, 
(distinguishing between providing aid to governments that are actively fighting 
corruption and to those which do not prioritize such reforms). 
21 I list growth and poverty alleviation together, recognizing that a more 
complete analysis ought to treat them separately because growth can occur at the 
same time as poverty rates stagnate or increase. 
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another.  For example, an anti-corruption program directed toward 
promoting economic growth in poor countries (case E) may 
enhance competitiveness and contribute to the development of 
more efficient global markets.  The discussion is organized by 
strategies to highlight the possible tensions between the activities 
of international institutions and the aims of powerful domestic 
political and economic actors, some of whom may be involved in 
corrupt activities and all of whom are eager to defend national 
sovereignty against outside meddling.  Other international actors, 
such as organized crime bodies, terrorist groups, and corrupt 
multinational firms, may seek to undermine reform efforts.  In the 
most difficult cases, they ally with domestic groups that benefit 
from the corrupt status quo. 
 













Provision A B  
International 
Institutions   C D 
Anti-Corruption 
Programs E F  
 
3.1. Information Provision [Cases A&B] 
Information provision seems relatively unproblematic because 
it simply aids domestic policymakers and leaves it to them to use 
or ignore this material as they wish.22  There is no conditionality 
and no direct funding for governments or domestic groups. 
However, although information provision is relatively 
unobtrusive, gathering that information can be fraught with 
controversy.  Three sorts of information are relevant: social science 
evaluations of reform policies, cross-country data on corruption 
levels and government quality, and investigative reporting by 
journalists or advocacy groups.  This material can contribute to 
                                                     
22 See Wren-Lewis, supra note 12, at 95–96 (arguing that providing access to 
adequate information may lead to reduced corruption). 
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both economic and political reform so I consider these two goals 
together (cases A and B). 
3.1.1. Social Science Information 
Information about possible policy initiatives needs to be 
grounded in valid studies that document the success or failure of 
policies in a variety of settings.  Results in one country can help 
establish benchmarks for reforms elsewhere.  To do this, 
governments must cooperate with donors up-front in the design of 
projects that include competent social science evaluations.  
Unfortunately, evaluation may seem risky both to incumbent 
politicians who fear objective data and to donors who worry that 
evidence of failure will undermine their credibility.  Even when 
governments and donors cooperate, studies must comply with 
social science protocols, including the collection of baseline data, 
valid study design, and competent statistical analysis.  This 
compliance will require international institutions to design, carry 
out and monitor pilot programs.  Providing information on what 
works and what does not is impossible without hands-on projects 
in countries at risk of corruption. 
There is an ongoing debate in economics and political science 
over the best evaluation methods.  Nevertheless, there is 
widespread agreement on the limitations of many current claims 
for policy efficacy.  International bodies, possessing staff expertise 
in evaluation, need to do more to incorporate evaluation 
procedures into projects for governance and anti-corruption 
reform.  This may require them to provide some tailored benefits 
(“carrots”) to governments willing to accept evaluation as part of 
an aid program and to incorporate the stick of reduced funding if 
they do not.  It is not sufficient merely to provide information 
about on-going projects; the projects themselves must be set up 
with built-in evaluation processes. 
Assuming that these evaluations locate successful 
interventions, IFI staff should bring these positive cases to the 
attention of officials in other countries.  At a minimum, IFIs should 
be information banks that public officials worldwide can turn to 
for help.23  IFIs should have a toolkit of options that developing 
                                                     
23 See Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington 
Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning 
from a Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 973, 982–86 (2006) (arguing that 
institutions such as the World Bank ought to tailor reform options based on 
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countries can use to develop their domestic strategies.  This does 
not imply that one-size-fits-all.  Some countries might well reject 
particular reforms as incompatible with their own situation, but if 
they want financial assistance from aid agencies, they should have 
the burden of explaining why they won’t adopt good governance 
and anti-corruption reforms shown to work elsewhere.  The 
difficulty, of course, is that corrupt officials and contractors will try 
to neutralize and undermine programs that aim to improve 
government accountability and transparency.  Representatives of 
donor agencies may be similarly reluctant to support serious and 
systematic evaluation, especially after working closely with host 
governments over the years. 
At present, we still don’t have a good data on the relative 
effectiveness of most reform programs.24  After fifteen years of 
effort to promote anti-corruption and good governance, it would 
be valuable to consolidate experience across projects sponsored by 
aid and lending organizations—sharing successes, failures, and 
ambiguous cases.  A fundamental problem concerns public 
information that names countries and projects.  Specific context is 
needed to be able to decide if a program that worked in one 
country will succeed elsewhere.  Domestic policymakers need to 
know how to evaluate programs that worked in other countries in 
order to generate local buy-in.  Yet, country leaders often object to 
publicizing projects that will put them in a bad light.  Publicizing 
an anti-corruption program, even a successful one, may suggest 
that corruption is a particular problem in that country.  
Alternatively, incumbent politicians may be too eager to flag the 
malfeasance of the previous government in the hope of assuring 
their own reelection.  Thus, some evaluations will be easier to 
accomplish than others, and some political contexts will simply be 
impossible to use as sites for evaluation studies. 
                                                                                                                        
individual country experiences, eschewing the so-called “Washington 
Consensus”).  
24 Nevertheless, some thoughtful efforts exist.  For example, see JENNIFER 
BUSSELL, CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN INDIA: PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
(2012) (evaluating the anti-corruption effects of one-stop-shops in India and 
relating their impact to the political situation in the Indian states).  For an 
overview of recent studies that evaluate anti-corruption policy reforms, see REMA 
HANNA ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: WHAT HAS 
WORKED, WHAT HASN’T, AND WHAT WE DON’T KNOW—A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
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In particular, to enhance government legitimacy (case B), 
institutions that promote accountability and transparency need 
more study.  At a theoretical level, their role in promoting anti-
corruption and good governance seems clear, but we do not know 
much about their practical operation, or about what conditions are 
required to make them effective.  Complicating any effort at solid 
analysis, both country officials and representatives of donor 
agencies may benefit from the lack of solid data on the effect of 
good governance programs.  Suppose, for example, that an anti-
corruption program involves a series of seminars and workshops 
for public officials with per diems set to encourage attendance.  
Given the lack of hard measures of corruption reduction, 
attendance at these events may be reported as a measure of success 
with the officials benefiting from the expense-paid trips.25  
To begin to close this knowledge-gap, World Bank researchers 
are studying the role of anti-corruption authorities (ACAs).  They 
find that the success or failure of ACAs depends crucially on the 
national context, but they have also isolated common 
characteristics that predict success.26  The World Bank has 
launched a broader initiative to promote the demand for good 
governance, and can point to some positive cases.27  However, 
more research is needed both to conceptualize the way 
accountability institutions operate and to understand how these 
institutions behave in different national settings. 
                                                     
25 For a study about per diem compensation in connection with seminars and 
workshops, see TINA SØREIDE, ARNE TOSTENSEN, & I.A. SKAGE, HUNTING FOR PER 
DIEM: THE USES AND ABUSES OF TRAVEL COMPENSATION IN THREE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (2012), available at http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/ 
publications/evaluations/publication?key=390706. 
26 See Francesca Recanatini, Anti-corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to 
Curb Corruption?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, 
VOLUME II, supra note 14, at 565 (describing political will and commitment as “the 
cornerstone of every successful anti-corruption effort”).  Recanatini chairs the 
Anti-Corruption Thematic Group at the World Bank that is studying the 
effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Authorities in collaboration with the United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, the U.S. State Department, and the European 
Commission.  Data from this project are available at http://www.acauthorities. 
org. 
27 See Social Accountability & Demand for Good Governance, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/09MJLAICW0 (last visited May 5, 2013) (highlighting 
citizen-driven initiatives that seek to achieve better governance by engaging in 
discussion and providing resources to others); see also Anticorruption, THE WORLD 
BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/QYRWVXVH40 (last visited May 5, 2013) 
(posting news articles about fighting corruption in different nations). 
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Whatever other strategies are pursued, the compilation and 
distribution of project-level information provide valuable 
background information.  But knowledge alone may have little 
impact.  Corrupt officials and contractors may ignore the 
information and continue to undermine development projects.  
They may announce programs to improve government 
accountability and transparency, and even draw on information 
provided by international actors, but it all may be a sham designed 
only to produce good publicity. 
3.1.2. Cross-Country Data 
Cross-country data can and should be produced independently 
of individual country governments.  These indices are likely to 
provoke criticism from governments that score poorly on 
dimensions such as the control of corruption, voice and 
accountability, and money laundering.  The weaknesses of indices 
that purport to capture a country’s overall level of corruption are 
well known, but this data has, nevertheless, helped to spur the 
global debate and given reformers in poorly ranked countries a 
lever to push for change.  The more important these indices 
become in shaping policy, the more important it is that they bear 
some relationship to reality and do not convey a false sense of 
precision.28 
Anti-corruption programs, even seemingly successful ones, do 
not quickly translate into improved index numbers.  Unlike some 
measures of macro-economic performances, the link between 
policies and index numbers is weak.  The indices are imperfect, 
and the causal links between policies and corruption levels are 
poorly understood.  Cross-country data will continue to be 
produced, and they help keep the issue before the public, but they 
should be supplemented by project-level research that looks in 
detail at causal links. 
Sometimes organizations that publish cross-country 
information go beyond the simple production of indices to apply 
direct pressure on countries that score poorly.  For example, the 
                                                     
28 See Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Introduction: 
Global Governance by Indicators, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER 
THROUGH QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS 1, 9 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012) 
(“Indicators often have embedded within them . . . a much more far-reaching 
theory—which some might call it an ‘ideology’—of what a good society is, or how 
governance should ideally be conducted to achieve the best possible 
approximation of a good society or good policy.”). 
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Financial Action Task Force (FATF) not only scores countries on 
their control of illicit financial flows, but also lists some as falling 
below acceptable levels.29  Similarly, although they do not single 
out especially bad actors, civil society organizations, such as 
Transparency International and Global Integrity, nevertheless, use 
their own and others’ data to argue for reform.  They go beyond 
the simple provision of information to advocate for change 
through local chapters or through alliances with local actors. 
Objective cross-country information about the possible results 
of corruption and inefficiency can help spur reforms in individual 
countries.  International bodies could compile benchmark data on 
the cost and performance of public projects to alert potential 
whistleblowers and to provide ammunition to reformers.30  Data 
on the costs of power projects, road building, hospital and school 
construction, and port renewal, for example, could be assembled 
from multiple sources.  Defense spending is one area of particular 
concern because of the secrecy that accompanies such purchases.  
Nevertheless, even there, egregious examples of overpricing may 
surface.31  Of course, the data would be quite rough and could not 
be used to prove corruption on their own, but if the cost of one 
country’s project is far out of line with the global benchmark, this 
discrepancy could trigger an investigation.  It operates like a red 
flag. 
                                                     
29 See Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE 
(July 2011), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf 
(measuring and analyzing political corruption’s link to money laundering across 
countries). 
30 See Wren-Lewis, supra note 12, at 100–01 (advocating for increased whistle-
blowing in order to increase available information, while also mentioning the 
need for international organizations to make whistle-blowers feel safer).  See 
generally Miriam A. Golden & Lucio Picci, Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, 
Illustrated with Italian Data, 17 ECON. & POL. 37 (2005) (detailing efforts to detect 
fraud by comparing productivity of public infrastructure spending across Italian 
regions). 
31 For example, Uganda recently purchased at least eight Russian fighter jets 
for $744 million dollars.  Nicholas Bariyo, Uganda Buys Fighter Jets, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704013604576248 
094099823846.html.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
01_ROSE-ACKERMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:54 PM 
468 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:3 
3.1.3 Investigative Reporting32 
If the local media is weak and dependent either on the 
government or on wealthy private interests, then outside actors 
can help to support any remaining independent outlets and can 
engage in reporting activities independent of local entities.  These 
groups might supply well-researched stories to local outlets.  They 
can be a place for whistleblowers to report and could provide 
protection to those who reveal corruption when that is a risky 
activity.  They can seek reform in libel laws that make it easy for 
journalists to “insult” the political and economic elite in ways that 
“violate national sovereignty” and to be subject to fines and 
imprisonment.  One way to do this is to defend journalists under 
these laws, publicize cases, and attempt to raise popular awareness 
of the harm caused by such restrictive laws.33  These actions will be 
controversial.  Sitting governments are unlikely to welcome 
investigative reporting and whistle blowing from any source 
unless it reveals malfeasance by political opponents.  International 
actors may be accused of meddling in domestic politics, and their 
domestic counterparts may be labeled enemies of the state and 
tools of external interests.  This puts a high premium on getting the 
facts rights and providing documentation that insiders can use to 
work for reform.  Otherwise, news reports risk manipulation by 
insiders eager to discredit each other.  The basic reality is that anti-
corruption strategies always have political overtones even if the 
targets are low-level officials.  The stakes are especially high, 
however, if the targets are political leaders, private sector elites, or 
multi-national firms.  
International actors may also be able to help local media make 
effective use of new electronic sources of communication and to 
help members of the public participate in newsgathering and 
dissemination, what Alan Rusbridger calls “the mutualization” of 
the news.34  The line between journalists and the public is 
                                                     
32 In this section I draw heavily from Michela Wrong’s work regarding 
media’s role in exposing corruption.  See Michela Wrong, How International Actors 
Can Help the Media in Developing Countries Play a Stronger Role in Combating 
Corruption, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 103, supra note 1.  
33 See REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf.org (last visited May 5, 
2013) (supporting reporters assigned to dangerous areas and combating 
censorship of print and digital media).  
34 Alan Rusbridger, The Splintering of the Fourth Estate, THE GUARDIAN 
(Manchester), Nov. 19, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/ 
nov/19/open-collaborative-future-journalism; see also COCKCROFT, supra note 13. 
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becoming blurred.  Although the media’s influence is deeply 
dependent upon its local character, outsiders can help with 
training and by providing software to facilitate the move away 
from conventional media to “social media.” 
3.1.4. Links between Information Provision Strategies 
In practice, the three forms of information provision are 
interrelated.  Journalists publicize research results and help make 
the data salient.  They use cross-country indices and evaluation 
reports to suggest where to probe further.  Conversely, scandals 
uncovered by journalists and advocacy organizations can prompt 
more systematic social science research.  Activists and the media 
may be impatient with the caution that researchers display in 
expressing strong conclusions, but over the past two decades, 
social scientists have given credibility to the alarms raised by 
investigative reporting.  Furthermore, “grand” corruption at the 
top of the state is not easily amenable to statistical analysis, but it 
may be the most harmful to a country struggling to escape from 
poverty or the ravages of war.  It can be revealed both by the 
investigative reporting of journalists and NGOs, and by lawsuits 
that reveal corrupt dealings. 
3.2. International Actions to Control Corruption [Cases C & D] 
International institutions can supplement domestic anti-
corruption efforts without directly intervening in domestic 
practices.  A country that ratifies a treaty or joins a cooperative 
effort may commit to domestic anti-corruption policies, but it does 
this voluntarily as part of its responsibilities under the 
international body’s rules. 
There are two main types of international bodies: multinational 
bodies that coordinate and supplement local anti-corruption and 
good governance efforts, including those based on domestic 
criminal law, and bodies that have independent authority to 
resolve cross-border commercial disputes where corruption may 
be alleged.  The first strategy will mainly supplement domestic 
efforts to control corruption (case C).  The second may help as well, 
but its primary aim is to resolve disputes so as to promote the 
efficiency of international markets (case D).  Some of these bodies 
are established by treaty.  Others are the result of voluntary efforts 
by states or private parties. 
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3.2.1. International Support for Domestic Efforts [Case C] 
Some international institutions concentrate on promoting the 
legitimacy and transparency of domestic governments, using a 
variety of approaches.  I discuss international professional 
networks, voluntary business standards, and help for domestic law 
enforcement efforts. 
3.2.1.1. Professional Networks 
Global professional associations of comptrollers general, 
ombudsmen, electoral commissioners, and other public officials 
meet to share ideas and to establish codes of ethics and good 
practice.35  These bodies also provide training for officials in 
emerging economies, and support embattled incumbents whose 
independence is threatened. 
Similarly, international civil society organizations, not 
connected with governments, help their non-governmental 
counterparts working in difficult environments.  For example, 
international associations of journalists provide training in 
investigative reporting and can also supply legal advice and 
international publicity to newspapers facing government 
harassment.  Advocacy groups can support and train domestic 
civil society activists and help to protect those who face criticism 
and even arrest in hostile environments. 
3.2.1.2. Voluntary Business Initiatives 
Several efforts are underway to obtain the voluntary 
cooperation of businesses.  The International Chamber of 
Commerce has established a code of conduct for firms.  The United 
Nations Global Compact and ISO 26000 encourage firms to sign on 
to a set of ethical principles including anti-corruption.36  The Global 
Compact contracted with Transparency International in 2009 to 
produce a guidance document for firms, but the process is just 
beginning, and the groups’ websites are not very informative.  As 
Tina Søreide has pointed out, the incentives of top firm managers 
may not align with those lower down, employees may be reluctant 
                                                     
35 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 126 (2004). 
36 See UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited 
May 5, 2013); Int’l Org. for Standardization, Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO 
26000 (July 1, 2008), available at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000: 
ed-1:v1:en. 
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to speak out, and legal systems differ in the way they apply anti-
corruption laws to organizations and employees.37  Nevertheless, 
the ongoing efforts are a positive step. 
A recent endeavor, the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) seeks greater transparency in corporate/country 
agreements in the mining, oil, and gas industries.  The EITI does 
not measure corruption directly.  The goal is to permit individuals 
and advocacy groups to monitor the flow of funds with the aim of 
benefitting the citizens of countries with valuable resources.  This 
effort grew out of the Publish What You Pay initiative that targeted 
only multi-national firms.  Under EITI, countries can become 
candidate countries, and then have two and half years to propose 
plans that are compliant with EITI standards.  These standards 
focus on transparent reporting and auditing of payments from 
firms to countries.  Firms that support the initiative must publish 
what they pay to compliant countries and submit a self-assessment 
to EITI.38 
These efforts respond to the possibility that, for some 
international deals, neither host country elites nor their 
counterparts in the capital-providing nations have an interest in 
revealing and limiting corruption unless pressured by outsiders.  
Both buyers and sellers benefit from the weak legal environment in 
host countries.  The leaders of host countries enrich themselves, 
and home countries support the business operations of their 
multinational firms. 
Generally, these monitoring mechanisms have no legal force, 
but they can produce public relations difficulties for lagging firms 
and countries.  That is the goal of the EITI.  Similarly, the FATF, 
mentioned above, has no hard legal power but relies on the black 
mark of a bad rating in the control of financial flows (money 
laundering) to spur change.  Other organizations may piggyback 
off of these ratings in making decisions about funding and other 
forms of engagement.39  Civil society bodies also rank countries on 
                                                     
37 Tina Søreide, The Governance of Infrastructure Regulation: An Economist’s 
View, in EMERGING ISSUES IN COMPETITION, COLLUSION, AND REGULATION OF 
NETWORK INDUSTRIES 191, 207–08 (Antonio Estache ed., 2011). 
38 See, e.g., EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org (last 
visited May 5, 2013). 
39 Roberto de Michele, How Can International Financial Institutions Support 
Countries’ Efforts to Prevent Corruption Under International Treaties and Agreements?, 
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 179, supra note 1. 
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levels of corruption, government accountability, and freedom of 
the press and media. 
3.2.1.3. Treaties and Domestic Prosecutions of International 
Offenses 
International institutions and treaties help in the prosecution of 
domestic corruption offenses and push cooperating states to 
expand the reach of domestic law.  Interpol and the UN 
Convention against Corruption require inter-state cooperation, 
including extradition and help with asset recovery.  Going further, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Convention against Corruption and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) procurement guidelines deal with corruption 
that crosses national boundaries.  The OECD Convention came into 
force in 1999 and builds on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1977.  It requires ratifying countries to make it an offense for 
their firms to pay bribes abroad to obtain and retain business, and 
it also requires them to make the companies’ officials liable.40  The 
OECD Convention is monitored by a Working Group whose only 
sanction is bad publicity.  Nevertheless, its actions appear to be 
having an impact.  The United States remains the most active 
enforcer of the OECD Convention, but other countries are 
beginning to bring cases, and the reach of the U.S. law is broad.  In 
addition, the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) requires firms in extractive 
industries to file reports that mimic the EITI.  It applies to all firms 
listed on U.S. exchanges wherever their headquarters are located.  
This development is an example of a “soft law” initiative becoming 
hard law in one country.  It may set an example for other countries, 
and again, the reach of the U.S. law is broad because so many 
multi-national firms are listed on U.S. exchanges. 
In a few cases, the courts of one country, such as the United 
States, can be used to address offenses that occurred in countries 
with weak or corrupt judiciaries.  Sometimes foreign courts help 
                                                     
40 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Apr. 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 4, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2017813_1_1_1_1,0
0.html; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1495 
(1977).  See Mark Pieth, From Talk to Action: The OECD Experience, in ANTI-
CORRUPTION POLICY 151, supra note 1.  
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with recovery of assets held abroad.41  Even the Swiss have 
recently frozen questionable assets of deposed rulers and have 
transferred those funds to incumbents who claim that the funds 
belong to the state.  The World Bank’s Stolen Asset Recovery 
Initiative (StAR) aims to assist countries seeking to recover illicitly 
appropriated assets, but the task is difficult.42  Sophisticated money 
launderers hide funds in major financial centers, disguising the 
funds’ origin through a chain of shell companies.  Although 
domestic actions can be useful in particular cases, especially when 
aided by information from banking havens, they hardly represent 
a general solution.43  
 
                                                     
41 Recently, the U. S. Supreme Court held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) in a case 
outside the corruption area, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. __ 
(2013).  The opinion below held that the ATS did not apply to corporations, Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).  However, that issue 
was not resolved by the Supreme Court.  The opinion in IV only states that mere 
corporate presence was not sufficient for the ATS to apply, and the concurrence in 
III found the corporate presence “minimal and indirect” because they only had 
offices in New York and were traded on the New York Stock Exchange. See also 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and Flomo v. Firestone Nat. 
Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).  In the former case the D.C. Circuit 
held that the ATS applied to corporate conduct and allowed a case against Exxon 
Mobil brought by Indonesian villagers claiming human rights violations to go 
forward.  The Seventh Circuit opinion held that the ATS applies to corporations 
but that the plaintiffs, twenty-three Liberian children, had not shown that 
Firestone violated customary international law.  Other foreign litigants have used 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to seek damages 
from companies under the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts that are alleged to have 
engaged in corrupt or fraudulent behavior.  For a recent example, see Ukrvaktsina 
v. Olden Group, LLC, 2011 WL 5244697 (2011). 
42 See THE WORLD BANK: STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE (STAR), 
http://star.worldbank.org/star (last visited May 7, 2013) (explaining the 
assistance provided to countries seeking to recover assets).  See generally Dubois & 
Nowlan, supra note 6 (evaluating the effect of sanctions on fraud and corruption 
in the World Bank’s poverty reduction efforts). 
43 For an example of the reluctance of U.S. courts to judge the validity of 
allegedly corrupt and fraudulent bankruptcies abroad, see generally Films by 
Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).  See also Vadim Volkov, 
The Selective Use of State Capacity in Russia’s Economy: Property Disputes and 
Enterprise Takeovers, 1998–2002, in CREATING SOCIAL TRUST IN POST-SOCIALIST 
TRANSITION 126, 136, 146 n.15 (János Kornai et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the 
background of Films by Jove v. Berov).  For a discussion of tax havens, see generally 
NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: TAX HAVENS AND THE MEN WHO STOLE THE 
WORLD (2010). 
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3.2.1.4. Weaknesses in the Existing System 
Kevin Davis critiques enforcement systems that depend too 
heavily on international regimes.44  He worries that they will not 
reflect domestic priorities in states where high-level corruption is 
pervasive.  He also argues that if a state relies too heavily on 
international institutions to further anti-corruption aims, it may fail 
to reform internally.  International solutions need to be accountable 
to the domestic public in deciding where and how to intervene. 
Even on their own terms, the international instruments have 
weaknesses.  None has strong international legal mechanisms for 
controlling corruption that crosses national borders.  Even when 
the offense occurs in connection with international trade or 
investment, law enforcement is domestic.45  Indeed, the Dodd-
Frank law has only a reporting requirement, although it could spur 
investigations under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA). 
Some international institutions help domestic efforts to fight 
corruption, while others seek to improve state functioning.  
Professional bodies share information and experiences and support 
embattled domestic reformers.  Extradition treaties and procedures 
for sharing information via Interpol help local police and 
prosecutors develop strong cases.  The OECD Convention requires 
signatories to make it a domestic offense for their businesses and 
individuals to pay bribes abroad, but enforcement depends upon 
prosecutorial priorities.  There are no private rights of action for 
either domestic or foreign individuals. 
There are weaknesses on two fronts.  First, the treaties and 
institutions that seek to control international corruption are 
voluntary systems that nation states join only if they are willing to 
accept the treaties’ conditions.  Second, domestic courts seldom 
take on foreign bribery cases, unless they involve domestic firms 
under the OECD Convention or concern the transfer of assets held 
in a country’s financial institutions.  Law enforcement bodies may 
extradite accused offenders, but they do not bring the cases 
themselves.  However, one system has legal force—the 
international arbitration regime—to which I now turn. 
                                                     
44 See Kevin Davis, Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help 
Developing Countries?, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 169, supra note 1 (noting that 
“relying on foreign institutions also has significant limitations”). 
45 See Pieth, supra note 40 (pointing to these and other domestic enforcement 
weaknesses while urging stronger actions to monitor and hold firms accountable). 
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3.2.2. International Arbitration and Domestic Court Cases     
[Case D] 
The international arbitration regime is the main international 
forum for resolving commercial disputes where corruption may be 
alleged.  Corruption, although recognized as an important issue, 
remains a vexing and difficult problem for arbitrators, given their 
insulation from domestic criminal law institutions.46  Nevertheless, 
the institutions that organize arbitrations are stepping gingerly into 
this arena as litigants seek to void contracts tainted by corruption.  
As Mark Pieth writes, “Arbitration is no longer an exclusive area of 
party-interest, especially as far as large infrastructure projects are 
involved.  It is right to consider corruption an issue of (domestic 
and international) public interest.”47 
One study identified thirty-eight international arbitration cases 
that dealt with corruption,48 but the arbitral system has not yet 
settled on an appropriate framework.  In an ironic twist, the first 
set of disputes arose between firms and their local intermediaries 
who allegedly had paid bribes.  The firms were seeking to avoid 
paying their agents on the ground that bribery was illegal, even if 
                                                     
46 See Joost Pauwelyn, Different Means, Same End: The Contribution of Trade and 
Investment Treaties to Anti-Corruption Policy, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 247, 261–
62, supra note 1 (arguing that an enforcement gap exists because arbitrators pursue 
the same ends as domestic criminal institutions but pursue these ends through 
different means).  See generally Olaf Meyer, The Formation of a Transnational Ordre 
Public against Corruption: Lessons for and from Arbitral Tribunals, in ANTI-
CORRUPTION POLICY 229, supra note 1 (noting that arbitrators are still developing 
standards for corruption cases).  The other venue for settling international 
economic disputes between states is the WTO.  According to Pauwelyn, supra at 
248, the term “corruption” did not appear in the WTO rulebook prior to the 2011 
Plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement.  WTO tribunals can consider 
corruption to the extent that it affects trade, but their reach is limited insofar as 
only nation states can bring claims, the tribunals only judge government conduct 
and not the conduct of private parties, and the penalties involve only reciprocal 
trade restrictions. 
47 Mark Pieth, Contractual Freedom v. Public Policy Considerations in Arbitration, 
in PRIVATE LAW: NATIONAL-GLOBAL-COMPARATIVE: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR INGEBORG 
SCHWENZER ZUM 60. GEBURTSTAG 1375, 1385 (Andrea Büchler & Markus Müller-
Chen eds., 2011).  See also Pauwelyn, supra note 46 (noting both the public and 
private interests in reducing corruption). 
48 Pauwelyn, 257, supra note 46 (“Olaya finds ‘approximately 38 international 
arbitration cases . . . known to deal with corruption’”) (citing Juanita Olaya, Good 
Governance and International Investment Law: The Challenges of Lack of Transparency 
and Corruption, presented at The Second Biennial SIEL Conference (July 8–10, 
2010)). 
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they knew that payoffs were taking place.49  In such cases, 
arbitrators generally refuse jurisdiction on the ground that they 
have no authority to resolve criminal allegations.  Going beyond 
disgruntled intermediaries, the arbitral status of contracts allegedly 
obtained by corruption is unclear, especially because they are 
plagued by problems of proof.  This result is unsatisfactory if the 
corrupt nature of the deal has harmed the complainant and if the 
domestic law enforcement system is dysfunctional or corrupt.  In 
many cases, neither the host state nor the international investor has 
an interest in raising corruption charges—even if they can be 
proved.  The exception, which has arisen in a number of cases, is 
when a new host government introduces evidence of corruption 
under the previous regime.50  
There are two types of forums.  One is the private commercial 
arbitration regime; the second, the World Bank’s International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), only 
considers cases where investors sue nation states, usually under 
the provisions of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  In both cases, 
private firms can initiate the arbitration process, but only if they 
are parties to the contracts in question.  Disappointed bidders, or 
other outsiders to the contract, have no standing.  Joost Pauwelyn 
argues that BIT provisions requiring “fair and equitable treatment” 
could be extended to cover corruption, but so far no cases have 
made that connection.51  
These weaknesses in the present system have led to reform 
proposals that range from the more explicit incorporation of 
corruption charges into the arbitral process to the creation of a 
separate body, either a formal court or another type of arbitral 
tribunal that would explicitly deal with claims that corruption 
should void a contract or, at least, lead to its renegotiation.  
Reforms may require structural changes.  Paul Carrington, for 
example, argues for a new international body to hear cases 
initiated by outsiders to the deal.  In the alternative, he suggests an 
                                                     
49 See Meyer, 232–34, supra note 46 (describing the types of corruption cases 
often arising in arbitration). 
50 For an example from ICSID, see World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006) (voiding a contract obtained by bribery).  
For a detailed explanation of World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, see 
Pauwelyn, 259–60, supra note 46. 
51 See Pauwelyn, 258–59, supra note 46 (explaining “fair and equitable 
treatment” provisions and stating that “[s]o far . . . no case of corruption has been 
found to constitute a breach of a BIT”). 
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expanded mandate for arbitrators to accept submissions from amici 
curiae that provide evidence of corruption.52  
However, even with this reform, arbitrators could not influence 
state governance structures directly.  They would simply 
invalidate contracts on the basis of evidence that corruption tainted 
the original deal.  Carrington’s ultimate goal is to increase the cost 
of paying and receiving bribes.  Even if a country’s criminal justice 
system is weak or corrupted, an arbitral decision that invalidates a 
contract, or awards damages to a successor government, ought to 
deter kickbacks up front.  This deterrent will be most effective in a 
multi-party democracy or in an autocracy whose leader is aging or 
losing popular support. 
Within existing domestic legal frameworks, corruption charges 
have been incorporated into the resolution of private law disputes 
in different ways.53  Litigants can sometimes use the legal system to 
obtain compensation for their losses, helping to deter corruption in 
the first place.  In the United States they have used private rights of 
action under U.S. securities and anti-trust laws, as well as fiduciary 
duty class actions, to seek redress.  Losing competitors have also 
claimed unfair competition or tort damages from firms convicted 
of overseas bribery in the United States and the European Union 
(EU).54  These cases may be a growth area for anti-corruption 
                                                     
52 See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 129, 154–64 (2010) (describing how “moderately successful efforts 
in the United States since 1862 to reward private citizens serving as enforcers of 
laws prohibiting corrupt practices” could be adapted by international 
organizations to improve enforcement of “new public international laws”); Paul 
D. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad, 
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 137–38 (2007) (concluding that the weakness of 
the current system justifies the creation of an international forum for resolving 
such disputes).  See also, Paul Carrington, Private Enforcement of International Law, 
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 285, supra note 1 (stating that the “need clearly exists” 
for the World Bank to “create a legal forum on the ICSID model that could enable 
and reward effective private enforcement of international anti-corruption law”).  
53 See generally Meyer, supra note 46 (discussing the rise of the international 
anti-corruption industry and the relationship between national and international 
standards in corruption cases). 
54 In the United States, see Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (illustrating a failed antitrust claim, in which the plaintiff alleged defendants 
bribed the United States government to maintain a monopoly in the Iraqi wheat 
market).  In the EU, see Case T-145/98, ADT v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-391 
(discussing applicants’ claim that there was an “infringement of the rules 
governing tendering procedures and of the principle of fair competition”).  In 
South Africa, see Transnet Ltd. v. Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd. 2004 (1) SA 299 (SCA) 
(noting that the award of purchase contract to the competitor of the respondent 
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efforts if domestic courts in industrialized countries prove ready to 
accept jurisdiction.55 
As Johann Graf Lambsdorff suggests, simply voiding the entire 
deal may be very costly for the ordinary citizens who benefit from 
the contract.56  Transaction-specific investments already in place 
can become worthless.  Furthermore, the sanction of invalidity is 
not tailored to the amount of harm; repeating the tender is costly 
and time consuming, and the firm may have little incentive to 
police its own employees.  This reality leads Lambsdorff to argue 
that contracts generally should be enforced but that the firm 
should pay damages of thirty times the bribe to wipe out its illicit 
gains.57  However, he recognizes that sometimes the entire deal is 
so tainted that it should be entirely void.  It may truly be a “white 
elephant” that is draining state resources.  In such cases, the 
contract should not be retendered; the project simply should be 
abandoned and damages levied.  Lambsdorff would also give the 
                                                                                                                        
was the result of a “fraudulent tender process”).  I am grateful to Abiola Makinwa 
for supplying these citations. 
55 Governments have also sometimes turned to ordinary courts for redress.  
See, e.g., Republic of Nigeria v. Santolina Inv. Corp., [2007] EWHC 3053 (QB) 
(U.K.) (holding that assets of a former Nigerian official held in British banks and 
real estate were bribes and should be transferred to Government of Nigeria).  The 
background of the case is discussed in GLOBAL WITNESS, INTERNATIONAL THIEF 
THIEF: HOW BRITISH BANKS ARE COMPLICIT IN NIGERIAN CORRUPTION (2010), available 
at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/international_thief_ 
thief_final.pdf.  See also an effort in U.S. court by a state-owned Costa Rican 
company to block Alcatel-Lucent’s FCPA settlement.  It sought restitution from 
the firm under a federal victim’s rights law.  See Richard L. Cassin, Costs Rica 
‘Victim’ Objects to Alcatel-Lucent Settlement, FCPA BLOG (May 5, 2011, 7:02 AM) 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/5/5/costa-rican-victim-objects-to-alcatel-
lucent-settlement.html.  After losses in the lower courts, the Costa Rican telephone 
company filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
December 2012.  See Thomas Fox, ICE Appeals Victims’ Rights Case to Supreme 
Court, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 3, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/ 
2012/12/3/ice-appeals-victim-rights-case-to-supreme-court.html.  The Alcatel 
case is discussed in Abiola Makinwa, Defining a Private Law Approach to Fighting 
Corruption, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 267, 278 n. 36, supra note 1.  
56 See Lambsdorff, supra note 19, at 224 (“Maintaining the validity of contracts 
and imposing fines on bribe-paying companies would reconcile anti-corruption 
with the preservation of investor confidence.”).  See also Mathias Nell, Contracts 
Obtained by Means of Bribery: Should They Be Void or Valid?, 27 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 159 
(2008) (explaining that nullifying corrupt contracts is counterproductive because it 
does not promote voluntary disclosure). 
57 To act as a deterrent, these payments would need to be a multiple of actual 
damages because those who pay bribes are often not caught. 
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host state the option to terminate future performance of the 
contract even if it is enforced with respect to completed actions.58  
I agree that a project with social value should be completed, 
but it does not follow that the original firm should do the work.  If 
it does not have special contract-specific expertise and can’t 
sabotage completion by a rival, the state should auction off the 
right to complete the contract.  More generally, there is a tradeoff 
between penalizing the corrupt firm and assuring the smooth 
completion of the project.  The underlying problem is that once a 
firm has been accused of corruption, it may simply seek to 
sabotage, loot, and undermine the project instead of instituting 
good internal monitoring systems.  The corrupt firm may be able to 
hold the state agency hostage and prevent effective enforcement. 
Lambsdorff’s proposals, however one evaluates them, 
highlight Pieth’s claim that the international arbitral system ought 
to go beyond the claims of the parties to consider the broader social 
implications of disputes.  The goal should be to deter corruption in 
the future, not just resolve the individual case in a satisfactory way.  
However, as the experience of the International Criminal Court 
illustrates, as soon as international bodies take up criminal 
offenses, they are no longer neutral arbiters of disputes.  The 
judges may be neutral, but the prosecutors will argue for 
conviction.  Public officials and firms accused of crimes will begin 
to push back, and questions will arise about the role of prosecutors 
with an anti-corruption mandate.  Yet, if the dispute remains a 
purely civil one, and if the contract remains in place, an 
opportunity for exerting leverage against corrupt firms and 
officials will be lost.  Reformers should seriously consider new 
ways of combining international dispute resolution with domestic 
criminal law enforcement.59 
                                                     
58 This is the second option presented by Meyer, supra note 46.  Kevin Davis 
also argues for enforcing the contract going forward so long as it remains a 
valuable deal for the host country.  See Kevin E. Davis, Civil Remedies for 
Corruption in Government Contracting: Zero Tolerance Versus Proportional Liability 
(Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper 2009/4, 2009), available at http://lsr. 
nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=nyu_lewp (arguing that 
remedies can be structured to create incentives for the generation of information 
that can facilitate the imposition of other sanctions). 
59 See Dugard, supra note 1 at 160–62 (critiquing the argument that corruption 
is actually a crime against humanity and therefore should be handled by the 
International Criminal Court).  See also Abiola O. Makinwa, A Transaction Approach 
to Fighting International Corruption, in GOVERNING SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF 
LAW? 175, 175 (J. Blad et al. eds., 2010) (advocating a “transaction approach” 
which attempts to “recognize the role of the state while at the same time 
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3.3. Anti-Corruption Projects and Programs [Cases E & F] 
The most intrusive forms of international intervention are aid 
and lending programs that seek directly to limit corruption or to 
assure that it doesn’t undermine program goals (cases E and F).  In 
both cases, funders from IFIs, bi-lateral donors, and private 
foundations intervene to support government reform and to limit 
waste and corruption.  They do this directly by supporting specific 
programs and indirectly, through “policy based” lending that 
provides budgetary support conditional on domestic government 
safeguards or “good governance” policies.  Nonprofits and the 
media play a subsidiary role in keeping anti-corruption on the 
agenda of IFIs and in helping in the design and monitoring of 
programs. 
International actors cannot legitimately force domestic 
governments to become honest and corruption-free.  They must 
induce governmental cooperation—sometimes by supporting 
projects that benefit the elite even though other priorities would 
better serve ordinary people.60  The pressure to approve projects 
can undermine efforts to hold governments to account.  The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness includes a pillar labeled 
“ownership.”  This principle includes strategies to improve 
institutions and tackle corruption.61  However, it may also induce 
donors to defer to local demands even when they suspect 
corruption and self-dealing.  Aid agencies typically impose audit 
requirements as a condition for aid, but they could make stronger 
efforts.  The claim that better auditing works to reduce corruption 
seems borne out by EU aid programs in Africa.  The EU uses its 
own auditors.  Observers in Africa believe that projects co-funded 
by the EU are less corrupt than others.62  In projects with weak 
financial controls, cost-overruns can simply lead the recipient 
                                                                                                                        
recognizing . . . the role of non-state auspices as well as non-state providers of 
governance” in fighting international corruption); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law 
and Economics of Bribery and Extortion, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 217 (2010) 
(discussing the law and economics of bribery and extortion in criminal law).  
60 See GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org (last visited May 6, 
2013) (chronicling instances of corruption in resource-rich nations). 
61 See Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, OECD, http://www. 
oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited May 6, 2013). 
62 See Søreide, Tostensen, & Skage, supra note 25, at 26 (mentioning EU 
auditing standards). 
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country to ask for and obtain more funds.63  The tension between 
projects that benefit ordinary people and those that benefit elites 
makes the concept of “ownership” problematic. 
Civil society groups can sometimes promote anti-corruption 
projects without central government approval—usually through 
monitoring activities, information gathering, or pilot projects.  
Sometimes IFIs and NGOs can work at the grassroots with local 
governments.  They may find local allies able to support reform 
without generating a backlash from the central government.  The 
goal is to finance development projects that benefit the population 
without triggering rent-seeking. 
These anti-corruption initiatives predictably generate tension 
and backlash.  Sometimes the very existence of aid funds fuels 
corruption in poor countries, because there are few other resources 
available.  There is a risk, as Wren-Lewis points out, that aid 
dependence makes government reform harder, not easier.64  Civil 
servants may be enlisted to further the anti-corruption agenda by 
aid funds that supplement their salaries, provide per diems for 
travel and conference attendance, and supply incentive payments 
for effective performance.  Such programs risk a backlash if they 
are terminated after a few years.  Local institutions cannot develop 
sustainable anti-corruption strategies if they are overly dependent 
on foreign financial and technical assistance. 
3.3.1. Economic Development and Anti-Corruption Policies 
Some reforms favored by IFIs on general development 
principles are also touted as anti-corruption strategies.  These 
reforms include fair bidding procedures for government 
procurement, improved financial auditing, transparent public 
decision-making processes, streamlined and simplified 
bureaucratic procedures, civil service reform, easy access to 
information, and prompt and easy-to-use appeals processes (case 
E).  Such reforms can both limit corrupt incentives and reduce 
other forms of waste and inefficiency.  They may be less 
                                                     
63 See SPECIAL INSPECTORS GENERAL FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, 
http://www.SIGIR.mil (last visited May 6, 2013) (providing numerous examples 
drawn from the rebuilding experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.).  For an 
overview of corruption in Afghanistan, see UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND 
CRIME, CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: RECENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS (2012), 
available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_ 
Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf. 
64 Wren-Lewis, supra note 12 at 96.  
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threatening to national leaders and more difficult for them to 
oppose if the benefits are improved service delivery and more 
effective implementation of tax and regulatory laws.  
Of course, procedures that increase transparency and invite 
public participation can lead to delay and invite controversy—so 
there may be tradeoffs between more government accountability 
and speed.  But quick action isn’t a virtue if it means that public 
officials can easily satisfy their own aims without concern for 
public or expert opinion. 
3.3.2. Promoting Government Legitimacy 
International institutions are likely to have a more limited 
impact when they try to promote government legitimacy (case F).  
A corrupt elite can simply condemn them as outside meddlers 
seeking to undermine state sovereignty.  Nevertheless, there are a 
few points of entry. 
I have already pointed to the utility of information-generating 
strategies.  Going beyond the mere provision of information, IFIs 
could condition their loans and grants on the host country’s 
adoption of mechanisms shown to work elsewhere.  These 
requirements must be real reforms, not just shams set up for 
international consumption.65  Furthermore, such conditionality will 
not be credible unless donors control corruption in their own 
projects and send a signal to suppliers and contractors that 
corruption will not be tolerated.66  
If payoffs and favoritism are deeply embedded in local 
practices, IFIs’ programs that mandate bureaucratic and 
programmatic reforms may be hard-pressed to show results.  Local 
officials must buy into the reforms, or they will fail.  Donors’ 
monitoring ought to build on baseline data on service delivery (or 
tax and customs receipts, environmental quality, etc.) so their staff 
can return after a time to see if the anti-corruption program had 
any impact.  This data need not always include actual measures of 
payoff levels.  Household and business surveys can get at 
individual experiences, especially when corruption is endemic, but 
there may also be other objective measures such as gaps between 
program goals and actual performance, levels of tax and tariff 
                                                     
65 See Recanatini, supra note 26 (stressing this problem in her analysis of anti-
corruption agencies). 
66 See Dubois & Nowlan, supra note 6, at 16–17 (arguing that the Global 
Administrative Law approach will help donors hold institutions accountable). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss3/1
01_ROSE-ACKERMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:54 PM 
2013] ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORM 483 
collections, and road quality.  Failures are just as important as 
successes and need to be part of an ongoing process of learning. 
Unfortunately, some countries may simply not be worth the 
time, funding, and trouble that it takes to provide help beyond the 
provision of information.  Geopolitical concerns may push the IFIs 
to continue to work in such countries, but those individuals at the 
staff level should argue that development goals are poorly served 
by continued funding of projects riddled with corruption.  In the 
worst case, aid fuels corruption by setting off an illicit competition 
for funds.67  Funds should be redirected to countries and projects 
that can credibly reduce poverty and aid growth and to projects 
that explicitly address governance challenges where points of 
leverage exist. 
3.3.3. Post-conflict Countries 
Post-conflict countries are a special case.  After the conflict 
ends, they often promptly receive massive aid flows for rebuilding 
but suffer from weak institutions that create opportunities for 
corruption.  If care is not taken, corruption can substitute for 
institutional development and become entrenched in the 
embryonic regime.  Of course, in some cases, former combatants, at 
both the high and low levels, may need to be bought off with one-
time cash and in-kind benefits.68  These transfers may be a 
condition for obtaining peace, but they need to be structured as 
lump-sum benefits that do not permanently distort the operation of 
the economy or the government.  Don’t give the rebel army turned 
political party a fifty percent ownership stake in the national oil 
company or promise warring ethnic groups a fixed share of the 
public pie.69  The aim should be to buy off such groups with lump-
sum payments, not give them an ongoing incentive to stay together 
and divide the country.  Furthermore, do not give the regular 
                                                     
67 See June & Heller, supra note 17 (stressing how corruption can be 
exacerbated by the potential for competition for funds). 
68 For example, in Mozambique, the United Nations provided generous 
funding to former rebels on the condition that they establish a political party and 
run candidates in elections.  Although much of the funding supported party 
development, many observers noted that funds also were used to provide direct 
financial benefits to former rebel leaders.  See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 
76–80 (providing further details and sources for this case). 
69 Such a division of benefits occurred in the post-conflict constitution in 
Burundi.  For a critical view of the result, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 80–
82. 
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military a stake in non-defense government programs and monitor 
its involvement in defense contracts, or it may use its coercive 
power to extort payoffs. 
International nonprofits such as TI, Global Witness, and Global 
Integrity, can be helpful here in monitoring the situation on the 
ground, but outside monitoring is not sufficient.  The donors’ own 
internal auditing and oversight bodies also need sufficient funding 
and support.  If international funders put speed ahead of integrity, 
they may be institutionalizing structural corruption problems in 
just those cases where aid might otherwise have had the biggest 
positive impact.70 
3.3.4. Emerging Economies 
Finally, Brazil, Russia, China, and India and other emerging 
economies will play an increasing role at the World Bank and at 
other IFIs that are developing anti-corruption initiatives.  Even 
when they cannot influence the IFIs overall policy, they can shape 
individual decisions through their own interactions with these 
institutions.  For example, IFIs are in no position to impose a 
comprehensive anti-corruption program on China even though 
corruption remains high there and may be increasing.71  
Nevertheless, top leadership expresses great concern about the 
problem and may be willing to learn from experiences elsewhere. 
4. “LEGAL” CORRUPTION: PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC POWER 
This essay concentrates on corruption that violates legal rules.  
Both the payment and the receipt of bribes and kickbacks are 
crimes in most countries—as are extortion threats and the 
embezzlement of public funds.  But private wealth influences 
public choices in many legal ways, such as campaign contributions, 
lobbying expenses, financial conflicts of interests, consultancy 
payments to the politically connected, and public relations 
campaigns designed to influence public opinion on particular 
                                                     
70 See June & Heller, supra note 17, at 20–21 (describing an impasse 
developing between rival political alliances following troop withdrawal from 
Lebanon); see generally Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17. 
71 On the continuing high levels of corruption in China, see generally Fu 
Hualing, The Upward and Downward Spirals in China’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement, 
in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA 390 (Mike McConville 
& Eva Pils eds., 2013). 
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issues.72  A crackdown on illegal payoffs may lead to a shift toward 
legal campaign contributions or lobbying.  Conversely, overly 
stringent limits on legal gifts are likely to push campaign 
contributions underground and into outright corrupt payoffs.  
Politicians who are overly dependent on wealthy interests may 
face defeat at the polls, but only if citizens know and care about the 
sources of candidates’ funds.  This suggests that crackdowns on 
political corruption should be complemented by increased 
transparency for campaign funding or by a move toward public 
financing.73  Limiting the role of money in politics requires a 
holistic approach that covers legal as well as illegal funds. 
In democracies the tension between private wealth and 
majoritarian values is as fundamental as that between organized 
groups and the general public, and each may feed off the other.  
Small groups of wealthy firms and individuals are likely to be able 
to organize more easily than broad publics.  If concentrated, well-
funded groups attempt to influence public opinion in their favor, 
and if they face few countervailing efforts, policies may obtain 
majority support even though the main beneficiaries are the 
wealthy elite. 
In authoritarian systems, there may be no overt tension because 
public and private elites are deeply interconnected.  Arms-length 
bribery and kickbacks are not necessary because top officials and 
the business elite are part of the same group that controls both the 
political and the economic systems.  Multi-national firms seeking 
business advantage cultivate ties with this elite and become part of 
the system.  In the extreme, the notion of “conflict-of-interest” is 
meaningless.  There is simply no public interest with a voice in the 
operation of the state. 
                                                     
72 The issues discussed here were emphasized by Daniel Kaufmann and Tina 
Søreide in the discussions at the Anti-Corruption Policy workshop.  See also 
Pauwelyn, supra note 46 (noting that failures at the sector level can be traced to 
political corruption); Søreide, supra note 2 (noting the influence of the private 
sector); Daniel Kaufmann & Pedro C. Vicente, Legal Corruption, 23 ECON. & POL. 
195 (2011) (analyzing the private sector’s influence gained through corruption); 
Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2009), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisis-business-corrup 
tion09_0127corruption.html (arguing that systematic corruption contributed 
significantly to the financial crisis).  
73 For one recommendation for public financing, see generally BRUCE 
ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS (2004) (recommending a publicly 
funded voucher system and a secret donation booth for private donations).  
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In general, whatever the form of government, there are 
tensions between the interests of even honest multi-nationals and 
the general public in host countries.  Multi-nationals seek profits 
and are not directly concerned with benefits to host nations’ 
citizens unless they show up in the bottom line.  International 
actors who engage with MNCs should go beyond a narrow anti-
corruption agenda.  In addition to urging MNCs support for 
curtailing corruption, these advocates should encourage corporate 
social responsibility policies that include a broader concern with 
host nation welfare.  Anti-corruption policy is not just about 
directly limiting bribes. 
Efforts to benefit ordinary people, improve the competitiveness 
of the economy, and enhance government accountability may all 
be stymied by the link between private wealth and public power.  
Worse yet, private wealth has a threat advantage.  Both local elites 
and multinational firms can invest outside the country if their 
privileged position is threatened.  This threat advantage points to 
another role for the international community.  It can help to 
smooth transitions to a more competitive market and a more 
accountable government, whether or not illegal payoffs are a major 
factor.  Although outright corruption in the form of bribes and 
kickbacks will remain a problem facing all polities for the 
foreseeable future, those interested in promoting economic growth, 
poverty alleviation, governance reform, and market efficiency also 
need to consider how the legal exercise of financial power 
undermines these values. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
My basic message is that international efforts to reduce 
corruption ought to be linked to the ultimate goals of economic 
development, government legitimacy, and international 
competitiveness.  Reductions in corruption are not ends in 
themselves but are part of the global focus on improving human 
well-being and government functioning.  In the past, reform of the 
state and the economy proceeded with little acknowledgment of 
the risks of corruption and self-dealing.  Some even argued for 
corruption’s functionality.  Now that the pathologies of bribery are 
well known, there is a risk of overreacting.  The temptation is 
simply to concentrate on creating clean government and honest aid 
projects without asking how economic and political power actually 
is distributed.  Conversely, initiatives that stress local “ownership,” 
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such as the Paris Declaration, risk downplaying the accountability 
of governments both to donors and to their own citizens.  
Although the Paris Declaration is full of language stressing results 
and accountability, it is not clear how to achieve “ownership” of 
these goals if the leadership is corrupt.  This suggests that the three 
roles for international actors—information provider, international 
facilitator, and domestic project sponsor—should be rethought. 
Under some conditions, neither domestic governments nor 
donor representatives see benefits from documenting corruption 
and from taking concrete steps to reduce its impact.  Both domestic 
and foreign investors may share this reluctance.  Here is where 
independent groups and the media need to concentrate attention.  
These watchdogs are unlikely to be funded well enough to carry 
out valid social science research on a large scale, but they can prod 
donors and governments to take corruption seriously enough to 
study it themselves. 
We need to learn more about how corruption operates in 
practice, both at the grassroots and at high levels.  Micro-analytic 
research should document successes and failures on the ground 
that go beyond reporting inputs, such as attendance at integrity 
workshops.  Corruption is a complex phenomenon that is difficult 
to measure, but in recent years researchers have developed a 
number of clever strategies to measure corruption or its impact, 
both directly and indirectly.  Hence, one relatively straightforward 
recommendation is to forge stronger links between aid projects and 
information provision so that governments can learn from others’ 
experiences.  At the top of the state, both cross-country 
benchmarking research and investigative reporting by journalists 
and civil society groups should be encouraged along with 
programs that train local investigative journalists and help to 
protect those facing harassment or worse. 
The system of international dispute resolution should consider 
corruption and self-dealing.  Arbitrators are beginning to 
acknowledge that their decisions reach beyond the parties and 
have an impact on the citizens of host countries—as well as on the 
integrity of the international trade and investment regime as a 
whole.  Perhaps a new international institution is needed to 
highlight these concerns or perhaps the arbitral regime can open 
up, but the current situation is clearly unacceptable given the costs 
of high-level corruption. 
Criminal prosecutions are likely to remain the province of 
domestic courts for the foreseeable future, but international bodies 
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can do more to help develop criminal cases and to support reform 
of criminal justice systems so that they are independent of politics 
and operate fairly and honestly.  A major risk of relying heavily on 
the criminal law, however, is that it can easily be abused to 
discredit political opponents.  Thus, international institutions 
should tread cautiously in promoting criminal law approaches. 
Anti-corruption initiatives need to take a more holistic 
approach.  A country’s development agencies should talk to 
counterparts that promote business, and financial regulators must 
talk to the police.74  This recommendation at the country level 
applies internationally as well.  There may be too much 
specialization of function, permitting corruption to flourish in the 
grey zones where no agency can act, or worse, where no one has an 
interest in acting.  Fighting corruption is too complex a task to 
reduce to a simple checklist for international actors.  My taxonomy, 
however, aims to help different actors to see how their own 
priorities overlap or conflict with others who are also trying to 
fight corruption throughout the world.  
 
  
                                                     
74 This argument is made by Global Witness.  See Global Witness, A Joined-Up 
Approach to Tackling Natural Resource-Related Corruption, and How There Isn’t One!, 
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 113, supra note 1 (describing how a “joined-up” 
approach is required to tackle natural resource corruption). 
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APPENDIX 
Attendees; Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors Play a 
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2011) 
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